many, where prosecutorial discretion is practically nonexistent. 9 According to this group, prosecutorial discretion makes easy the arbitrary, the discriminatory, and the oppressive. These arguments, both pro and con, apply in full force in the duplicative statute setting. Statutes are duplicative when the same conduct can be prosecuted under more than one statute. If the penalties required by the duplicative statutes differ, the danger is that different people who are equally situated can receive different punishments. While courts have allowed this result to follow from the prosecutor's decision whether to charge," it is questionable to allow discretion in the duplicative statute setting: the prosecutor has already made the decision to charge, the prosecutor and police have already allocated their limited funds;1 2 in short, a great deal of discretion has already been exercised. Professor Davis states, "Let us not oppose discretionary power, let us oppose unnecessary discretionary power,"' 3 and in the duplicative statute setting, it becomes more probable that the discretion is unnecessary. The prosecutor is given an extra tool which he might use as a lever for plea bargaining1 4 or as a means for retaliating against somebody he dislikes. These dangers of unfairness must be balanced against the alleged benefit of the discretionary power: that the prosecutor can tailor Justice Jackson emphasized the prosecutor's ability to do both good and evil:
The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty and reputation than any other person in America.... While the prosecutor at his best is one of the most beneficent forces in our society, when he acts from malice or other base motives, he is one the punishment to the crime and the defendant's individual circumstances.
I. THE BATCHELDER DECISION
In United States v. Batchelder i s the United States Supreme Court attempted to address the problem of prosecutorial discretion in the duplicative statute context. Yet it failed-to respond adequately to the arguments against that discretion, and did not make it clear that there is more than one type of duplicative statue. This comment will analyze Batchelder, set out a three-part scheme classifying duplicative statute situations, and discuss the Illinois Armed Violence Statute,'
6 which provides a clear example of the dangers inherent in duplicative statutes which are charged simultaneously.
A. BACKGROUND

United States v. Batchelder1
7 involved two statutes, each of which prohibited conduct the other did not, but which overlapped to the extent that they prohibited some of the same conduct. Batchelder had been convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922,18 part of which makes receipt by a felon of a firearm which previously has been transported by interstate commerce punishable 19 by no more than five years in prison or a $5,000 fine, or both. However, part of 18 U.S.C. App. § 1202(a) 20 which describes is 442 U.S. 114.
16 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 33A-2 (1977 ( & Supp. 1979 .
17 442 U.S. 114.
18
In pertinent part, 18 U.S.C. § 922(h) (1968) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person-(1) who is under indictment for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year;
(2) who is a fugitive from justice; (3) who is an unlawful user of or addicted to marihuana or any depressant stimulant drug... or narcotic drug... or (4) who has been adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been committed to any mental institution; to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. '9 The applicable statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a) (1968) , provides in relevant part: "Whoever violates any provision of this chapter... shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both...."
20 Section 1202(a) states: Any person who-(1) has been convicted by a court of the United States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of a felony, or (2) has been discharged from the Armed Forces under dishonorable conditions, or (3) has been adjudged by a court of the United exactly the same offense, sets a maximum of only two years in prison, or a $10,000 fine, or both.
21
The defendant received five years under § 922(h), and challenged the use of the harsher statute as a violation of his right to equal protection under the law.s The Seventh Circuit upheld the defendant's claim two-to-one23 Finding the legislative history inconclusive and the two statutory provisions inconsistent, the court used general principles of statutory construction in reaching its decision. 24 The court relied on the principles that criminal legislation should be applied in favor of lenity, that later enacted statutes may impliedly repeal earlier ones, and that when a serious doubt of constitutionality arises, the statute, if possible, will be construed so as to avoid the constitutional question.25 Since the court found constitutional problems with inconsistent penalties, it construed the statutes together as limiting imprisonment to two years for receipt of a firearm by a convicted felon. 26 The Seventh Circuit emphasized Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Berra v. United States. 27 Berra had been charged with tax fraud, punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000, or imprisonment of not more than five years, or both.'s He sought to instruct the jury that it could choose to convict under a different statute which covered the same conduct:
2 but which provided for a lesser penalty.
30
The majority opinion, assuming arguendo that both
States or any political subdivision thereof being mentally incompetent, or (4) having been a citizen of the United States has renounced his citizenship, or (5) being an alien is illegally or unlawfully in the United States, and who receives, possesses, transports in commerce or affecting commerce, after the date of enactment of this Act, any firearm shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years or both. 21 Justice Black explained that in Berra, unlike Beacon Brass, identical rather than differing proof was required for each offense, causing three constitutional flaws. First, under due process, statutes must fairly and clearly define the conduct to be made criminal and the possible punishment. This is not done where "either of these statutes can be selected as the controlling law at the whim of the prosecuting attorney." 3 8 Second, the delegation of such vast power to the prosecutor violates the doctrine of separation of powers, because it substitutes "the prosecutor's caprice for the adjudicatory process." 39 Third, under the equal protection clause, "no different or higher punishment should be imposed upon one than upon another if the offense and the circumstances are the same. The Seventh Circuit adopted these arguments in Batchelder. First, the court found that the two overlapping provisions of the Crime Control Act violated the due process clause because they too vaguely defined the punishment that could be administered.
4 2 Second, the broad delegation to the prosecutor violated the separation of powers doctrine. 4 3 Third, the likelihood of different treatment of similarly situated people violated the equal protection clause. 4 In rejecting the well settled rule that the prosecutor can choose which of two overlapping statutes can be applied to a particular defendant, 45 the court emphasized that the cases cited for this proposition involved statutes which did not have the same elements of proof. 4 6 The case was remanded for sentencing under the more lenient statute.
7
The dissent disagreed, finding support in the line of cases that the majority distinguished.
8 Even though in those cases the elements of proof tended to be different rather than identical, as in Batchelder, the dissent found them applicable because of the general theories of prosecutorial discretion which those cases endorsed. 49 The dissent added that "a dissenting opinion, [in Berra], even by a respected constitutional scholar such as the late Justice Black, is weak authority...."50 The importance of the Seventh Circuit Batchelder opinion is that it directly compares the two contradictory lines of cases dealing with duplicative statutes. One line originated in the Berra dissent and is followed in several federal 51 and state 52 courts. It holds that where statutes overlap so that the prosecutor can select the statute offering a harsher or milder penalty for exactly the same conduct, without any other guidelines, the equal protection clause is violated. The second and more recent line of cases holds that a prosecutor's ability to choose one statute over another in the overlapping situation is no different from his ability to choose whether to prosecute or what charge to bring.
53
This line of cases finds no violation of the equal protection clause. The Seventh Circuit endorsed the Berra dissent and its progeny after directly comparing them with the other authorities. However, the Supreme Court reversed without addressing the comparison in as much detail.
54
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Marshall found that the legislative history quite conclusively established Congressional intent to enact two independent gun control statutes, "each enforceable on its own terms. ' ' s Therefore, the court of appeals erred in its application of general principles of statutory construction because there was no ambiguity to interpret in favor of lenity, and no repeal was intended 5 6 As for the principle that courts construe statutes to avoid constitutional questions, the Court found no constitutional infirmities.
57
The Court recognized "the fundamental tenet that '[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes' "5 and that the sentencing provisions must clearly state the consequences of violating a criminal statute. Nevertheless, the Court found that the statutes gave adequate notice.
59
Even though two different penalties were possible, a defendant could know the range of punishment to which he might be subjected, just as he would in the typical statute providing for alternative punishment.
6 0 Moreover, the Court rested its judgment on the settled rule that "when an act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any one class of defendants." of proof give the prosecutor unfettered discretion, the Court held this analysis "factually and legally unsound. ' ' 6 2 Discretion is limited rather than unfettered in such cases because race, religion, and other suspect differences are constitutionally impermissible reasons for choosing one statute over another, thus placing real limits on the prosecu- Senator Long, the sponsor of § 1202, explained during floor debate that § 1202 would "take nothing" from, but merely "add to" Title IV. 114 CONG. REc. 14774 (1968) .
Representative Machen on the House floor stated that § 1202 would complement Title IV. 114 CONG. REc. 16286 (1968) he had where the statutes prohibited different conduct.
The Supreme Court similarly errs in comparing discretion in the overlapping statute situation to the prosecutor's decision whether to press charges at all. 8 2 The prosecutor has very broad discretion in deciding whether to prosecute, but he is guided in his exercise of discretion by the amount of evidence he can muster. This guidance is wholly lacking in a case like Batchelder because the evidence required under either statute is the same.
The Batchelder Court addressed the equal protection question by explaining that Oyler v. Boles s3 and Yick Wo v. Hopkins8 4 show the limit the equal protection clause places on prosecutorial discretion. Unlike the Berra dissent, the Batchelder court found that this limit was not exceeded. To understand the issue, however, it is first necessary to look at the equal protection clause itself.s 5 Briefly, the equal protection clause allows the government to make classifications in the creation and application of laws, but the classification cannot be based on an impermissible standard or be used arbitrarilys 6 Usually the classification is evaluated under the "rational relation" test: if the classification bears any rational relationship to the governmental purpose for enacting that classification, it will be upheld.
7 However, if a fundamental right is involved, such as first amendment rights, travel, voting or privacy,s 8 or if a "suspect" classification such as race, national origin, or alienage is used, 89 the "strict scrutiny" test applies. Under this more exacting test, the government must show a ''compelling" interest in the classification which is so important that it warrants overriding fundamental constitutional rights. 90 In addition, there must be no less drastic alternatives for reaching the governmental objective. right is involved. The statutes challenged in Batchelder made no classifications on their face.9 2 Rather, the danger is that they are arbitrary or capricious as applied. The equal protection clause covers application of statutes by government officials, 93 making the rational relation test appropriate.
The equal protection clause involves groups; it focuses on an individual who is treated differently because of the group to which he belongs. The Batchelder opinion and the Berra dissent each discuss equal protection, but in different ways. The Berra dissent assumes equal protection applies, but Batchelder discusses equal protection only as it relates to the defense of discriminatory prosecution. Since that defense involves being a member of a group discriminated against, at least some question arises as to whether it applies to Milton Batchelder, the defendant who never made that claim.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins 94 was the first case involving a successful defense of discriminatory prosecution, and the Batchelder Court, by invoking Oyler v. Boles, 9 5 aligns itself with the Yick Wo discussion of discriminatory prosecution. In Yick Wo, an ordinance concerning private laundries was found to violate the equal protection clause when it was enforced only against Chinese,' but it took Oyler v. Boles 97 to make explicit the two elements of proof necessary in a Yick Wo-type case. To show discriminatory prosecution, the defendant must prove that the prosecutor failed to proceed against others whom he knew to be in the same position as the defendant, and that the knowing discrimination was based on an unjustifiable standard. Oyler charged the prosecutor with discriminatory prosecution, and presented evidence that the mandatory life sentence had been invoked in only a minority of cases where it had been applicable. Id at 455. This defense failed because there was no showing that the prosecutor knew he could have proceeded against the others, or that he was using an unjustifiable standard. Id. at 456.
9 Id. at 373-74. The municipal ordinance made it unlawful to operate a private laundry without first obtaining the consent of a board of supervisors. Proof was presented which clearly showed that the ordinance was enforced only against Chinese. The Court found that the statute violated the equal protection clause because, even though it was neutral on its face, it was administered unequally and unfairly. 941 (1979) , where the court held that "relief was an active draft resister charged with violating a law requiring all people in his age group to carry a draft card.1'6 A defense of discriminatory prosecution was successful (the first amendment right to freedom of speech was implicated as well as the equal protection clause). Falk could show that many people without draft cards were not prosecuted, but there was no allegation that other similarly situated resisters were prosecuted. Falk did not show he was a member of a group being discriminated against, but he still won. There, the Court approved, by way of dicta, the proposition that because of the prosecutor's position in the judicial process, he must be given absolute immunity from tort liability to perform his function properly.
1°8
The Butz Court explained that the danger of retaliatory suits by angry defendants and the possibility that the prosecutor, facing such suits, would not initiate actions, or be as aggressive in court, warranted absolute immunity for the prosecutor in judicial and quasi-judicial spheres of action."° This would seem to include the selection of charges. Thus Batchelder and Butz together give the prosecutor free rein to be as vindictive and arbitrary as he pleases (short of discriminating against a suspect class), secure in the knowledge that he cannot be sued for damages, and that the defendant will would be available when intentional or purposeful discrimination was practiced against an individual (even though the discrimination was not class-based)," and that the defendant "could raise his claim of selective prosecution based on individual discrimination." Id. at 569 n.9. [Vol. 71 almost certainly be unable to have the charges overturned by claiming discriminatory prosecution.
Even assuming that the prosecutor is scrupulously fair,"1 0 there is still a great danger in the Batchelder approach because people may believe the prosecutor is acting unfairly. The canons of legal ethics recognize the danger of the appearance of impropriety even where none actually exists."' Our government may be one of laws rather than of men, but if people feel the laws are unfairly administered, the foundation becomes very shaky. As Justice Brandeis observed, "In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or ill, it teaches the whole people by its example.""11 2 The Batchelder decision is likely either to treat similarly situated people differently, and therefore unfairly, or else raise the fear that people will be so treated. An additional reason explaining the Court's action appears in the government's brief,'
13 the dissent to the Seventh Circuit Batchelder opinion," 4 several cases cited by the Court,"' and may be implicit in Justice Marshall's opinion. If the Seventh Circuit opinion had been upheld, numerous overlapping statutes" 6 would be struck down. This is basically a floodgates argument. Yet the results would be salutary rather than destructive. All that would be necessary is to take statutes such as the two in Batchelder and make them consistent: punish the same conduct with the same penalties and thus eliminate the undue discretion. One method would be to allow sentencing only under the less harsh of the two overlapping statutes. 1 ' 7 This would be a stopgap measure only, "o One hopes that most prosecutors exercise due care and act in as unbiased a way as they can in the performance of their duties. However, the old political observation that "[a] 11 power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely," see J. BARTLErr, BARTLETr'S FAMILIAR QUOTAATIONS 335a n.1 (13th ed. 1955) (1887 letter from John Emerich Edward Dalberg, Lord Acton, to Biship Mandell Creighton), suggests that the mere presence of the discretion given in overlapping statute situations could be dangerous. because it takes the decision of which penalty to apply to the proscribed conduct out of the legislature's hands. The legislature, if unsatisfied with the results of sentencing under the lesser statute, could repeal it, leaving the harsher one to be applied to all defendants. It could also repeal both and set a new penalty at something in between. Many of the problems caused by overlapping statutes merely result from sloppy legislative drafting." 8 Rather than opening floodgates, a Supreme Court decision adopting the arguments made in the Berra dissent would force legislators to be more thorough and careful in writing and amending criminal statutes. Such an opportunity should be firmly grasped rather than ignored out of fear of opening floodgates to legislative difficulties.
Though the Supreme Court in Batchelder did not cover in depth the necessity for prosecutorial discretion, one can assume that the traditional rationale for discretion is present. The presence of two statutes arguably gives the prosecutor a chance to individualize his treatment of defendants, 19 perhaps using the lesser statute for first offenders, or people who assist him to catch other law-breakers. However, those same goals could be achieved with one statute. The prosecutor would still have the option not to press charges, and even a single statute could have some variation in penalties assessed. With only one statute though, the prosecutor could no longer select a single statute by himself. The judge and jury would be brought into the penalty decision, thus shedding light on the entire process. Openness is recognized as one of the best ways to harness discretion;"' it could work here to prevent unfairness.
II. A METHOD OF ANALYSIS FOR DUPLICATIVE
STATUTES
Despite its shortcoming on both legal and policy grounds, Batchelder is the law. Where statutes forbid the same conduct, the prosecutor may choose either The tripartite framework has the advantage of covering all duplicative statute situations. Marshall's footnote in Batchelder adds at least some support to such a division.
127 This section will discuss all three situations.
A. IDENTICAL STATUTES
In diagram 1, the "A" circle represents conduct that Statute "A" prohibits, while the "B" circle represents conduct that Statute "B" prohibits. The duplicative statute problem occurs when conduct is prohibited by more than one statute. In the 127 Footnote 5 stresses that the statutes are not identical, suggesting that identical and overlapping statutes are to be treated differently. 442 U.S. at 119 n.5.
[Vol. 71 DIAGRAM 1 identical statute situation described above, the two circles completely overlap: all conduct that "A" proscribes, "B" also proscribes, and vice versa. Only the punishments are different. An identical statute situation also exists where a single statute defines the act prohibited, and then gives two alternative sentences either of which the prosecutor can choose at his discretion, with no underlying guidelines. The situation is most dramatic where one alternative is a misdeameanor and the other is a felony.1 8 s The Supreme Court has never dealt with statutes identical except for punishment. In Batchelder, the United States argued that even these statutes do not violate the equal protection clause,'2 but only the overlapping statutes previously discussed 130 were before the Court. However, all the cases the government cited' for the proposition that identical statutes are constitutional held only that overlapping statutes with different punishments were not constitutionally infirm, and did not even discuss identical, as opposed to overlapping, statutes.
The government's claim that even identical statutes with differing punishments (see diagram 1) do not violate the equal protection clause is the most extreme of the three duplicative statute situations because it gives the most unfettered discre- Pirky also hints at the notice problem, developed more fully in State v. Shondel. 138 Where two identical statutes offered widely different penalties, the court followed Lanzetta v. New Jersey' 3 9 in finding that penal statutes and their corresponding penalties must be clear and specific enough that a "person of ordinary intelligence" can understand them.
40
The Shondel court found that with no criteria in the identical statute situation, nobody can know what the penalty is, making for a deprivation of due process.
141
Pirkey alludes to still another constitutional flaw: unauthorized delegation of discretionary power.
42
Though the court rested its decision on equal protection, it suggested that the decision could also rest on the delegation of the legislature's power to the executive branch (prosecution).
43 While delegation has seldom succeeded as an argument since the days of Schechter Poultry Corp. v 
. United States,'"
Cardozo's cryptic description of the regulatory scheme there as "delegation running riot' 145 seems to apply just as much to statutes identical except for punishment. As in Schechter, the legislature has not done its job in drafting the statute, and must be more specific. Schechter serves as the outer limit, where delegation becomes impermissible,1 4 6 and identical statutes may reach that limit. In Schechter, the President was given the unbridled power to draft his own codes of fair competition, in any manner he wanted. Similarly, the prosecutor has REv. 469, 472 (1968) . Similarly, Judge Skelly Wright indicated that the reported demise of the delegation doctrine was "a bit premature," and heartily endorsed Schechter as an outer limit. Wright, Book Review, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 582 (1972) . Contra, Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1183, 1190 n.37 (1973).
the power under identical statutes to charge one person with a misdemeanor and another with a felony when the acts are identical, again with no legislative guidance. Thus, the doctrine of separation of powers is violated.
Before Batchelder, these state supreme court cases made it clear that statutes identical except for punishment were unconstitutional. However, Batchelder casts at least some doubt on this conclusion, even though it involved overlapping rather than identical statutes. These state cases used the broad equal protection argument found in the Berra dissent, but Batchelder limited equal protection to the defense of discriminatory prosecution. Batchelder also held that overlapping statutes gave adequate notice of the penalty because a person could look at both statutes to determine the range of possible penalties.
Though Batchelder undercuts some of the reasoning found in the state cases on identical statutes, they still should be found unconstitutional. The basic difference is one of degree. In overlapping statutes, the focus frequently is on different types of conduct, thus giving the prosecutor at least some idea of which statute he should proceed under. Where statutes are identical except for punishment, the prosecutor finds not the slightest shred of guidance. In this most extreme of duplicative statute situations, the prosecutor's discretion is totally unfettered. The significant danger of harrassment" 4 ' cannot be overlooked. Operating under the "rational relationship" lower tier of the equal protection clause, statutes identical except for punishment might well be struck down as unconstitutional on their face. The many state supreme court cases striking down such schemes used the sweeping equal protection argument of Berra, have widely varying punishments depend on which statutes the prosecutor chooses when he is given absolutely no guidance in distinguishing them. An advantage to this test is that it would not be necessary to go into the difficulties of proving membership in a discriminated-against group, as may be required' 49 under a defense of discriminatory prosecution.
The delegation argument also carries great weight in the identical statute situation. The complete absence of legislative standards places the situation within the prohibited outer limits defined by Schechter.
Policy as well as questionable constitutionality weigh against the use of statutes identical except for punishment. Harrassment is one factor. In other traditional areas of prosecutorial discretion, such as the decision to charge, the amount of evidence required serves as a guide, and is used in reviewing the case. Similarly, when choosing from different charges, where different types of conduct are more highly penalized, the legislature has decided which is more dangerous, and wishes both to punish and to deter future conduct."* Thus the legislature has given at least some guidance. Even in overlapping statutes, the types of conduct which differ between the two statutes can provide clues to the prosecutor. With identical statutes, there is no guidance and little review, so harrassment is easier.
In 150 Certainty of the punishment to be inflicted is probably one of the most important elements to deterrence. The confusion inherent in the identical statute situation might lessen the deterrent effect. For more details on the relationships between sentencing and deterrence, see A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976) .
151 This was not true in Batchelder, where there were cases both upholding and striking down overlapping statutes before the decision. Control and Safe Streets Act concerning receipt by a felon of a firearm which has traveled in interstate commerce, 57 and between the Mail Fraud Statute and the Sherman Act.' 5 Overlapping statutes have also been frequent at the state level.1 5 9 In fact, it is probable that the very frequency of overlapping statutes was a factor in the Supreme Court's decision to uphold the constitutionality of such statutes. 16°T he constitutionality of overlapping statutes was in considerable doubt before Batchelder. 16 ' However, after Batchelder it is clear that overlapping statutes are constitutional, even if the acts not covered by both statutes (the non-intersecting portion of diagram 2) are miniscule in comparison to the conduct prohibited by both statutes. In Batchelder, there was only a small difference in how the two statutes defined a penalty for a previously committed felony,16 2 but that difference was crucial for Justice Marshall. In both a footnote and the text, he 153The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § I (Supp. 11 1978), provides in pertinent part: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." The Mail Fraud Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. 11 1978) , provides in pertinent part: "Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud... places in any post office... or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail ... any such matter or thing...."
Overlap between these acts occurs in the area of rigging or price fixing, each of which is a per se violation of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 210 (1939) . The Mail Fraud Statute is violated when a scheme to defraud "is carried out by use of the mail," so charges could be brought under either statute whenever bid rigging or price fixing includes mailings. Since 1972 the United States Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois has made it a practice in Sherman Act cases to charge mail fraud violation. The Seventh Circuit has upheld the practice in United States v. Brighton Bldg. & Maintenance Co., 598 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 444 U.S. 840 (1979) 
1980]
only to duplicative statutes that have at least some difference in the conduct described.es Marshall's opinion does leave open the possibility that a legislature wishing to pass identical statutes might vary the conduct proscribed by a tiny amount in order to bring the statutes within the Batchelder opinion. This would escape the likely fate of identical statutes: to be overturned as unconstitutional.'r' Given the presumption that legislative motives will not be too closely examined by a reviewing court unless a suspect classification or fundamental right is involved,Ies such a legislative strategy might well succeed.
C. OPTIONAL INCLUDED DUPLICATIVE STATUTES
Optional included duplicative statutes are those in which the prosecutor has the option to charge along with a single crime an extra offense augmenting the penalty if the crime is committed in a certain way. If the prosecutor can prove the simple crime, the extra penalty attaches automatically, without any additional proof. He retains the option not to invoke the extra penalty.
The fact that little or no extra proof is required to trigger the optional included statute distinguishes the situation from greater and lesser included statutes in their traditional sense.'6 s In the latter situation a certain amount of proof is required to convict under the lesser statute, while that amount and an incremental amount of proof is needed to convict under the greater statute. The lesser included offense invariably carries a lesser penalty than the greater offense, but the difference in proof required places a check on the prosecutor. For example, simple assault, or placing another in fear of receiving a battery, is a lesser included offense of aggravated assault, which is typically defined as simple assault using a deadly weapon.
67
A potential duplication problem is raised where the prosecutor has enough evidence to convict under the greater statute because he still has the option to proceed under either. proof, however, gives the prosecutor an indication of how to use his discretion. If he can prove up the more severe statute, he is justified in proceeding under it because the state has declared the conduct to be more dangerous to society by penalizing it more heavily. Undoubtedly, the above statutory scheme is constitutional, as Batchelder pointed out. 1 6 However, the question of optional included duplicative statutes is far less certain. The concept itself is so elusive that the best way to discuss it is with a concrete example.
The Illinois Armed Violence Statute defines armed violence as any felony committed with a dangerous weapon. 1 6 Depending on the felony involved, the armed violence charge can take several forms. With respect to crimes such as homicide or kidnapping, armed violence is not always an option for the prosecutor because these crimes can be committed with or without a dangerous weapon. Where using a dangerous weapon is actually included in the definition of the crime, such as in the case of armed robbery, the armed violence statute would always be available to the prosecutor. Unlike a lesser included offense, proof elements provide no guide to the prosecutor. Moreover, whenever the prosecutor decides to bring charges both for armed violence and for the felony on which armed violence rests, the danger is that the multiple charges, which simply define the same conduct, can be unduly prejudicial to the defendant.
The Illinois Armed Violence Statute, until recently, existed in a different form. Under the previous version, the dangerous weapon requirement was similar, but armed violence could be used only where an enumerated group of crimes was involved, rather than all felonies.
1 70 Most of the litigation under this version involved aggravated assault, because even though the conduct required for conviction necessarily included armed violence, the former was a misdemeanor while the latter was ping, § 10-1; aggravated kidnapping, § 10-2; rape, § 11-1; deviate sexual assault, § 11-3; aggravated assault, § 12-2; aggravated battery, § 12-4; intimidation, § 12-6; compelling confessions by force, § 12-7; theft of over S150
in value, § 16-1; burglary, § 19-1; resisting a peace officer, § 31-1; escape from jail, § 31-6(a); or aiding an escape, § 31-7(b).
[Vol. 71 a felony. Armed violence in both forms is a useful springboard for discussion of optional included duplicative statutes. In either form it differs from the statutes previously discussed because it is charged in addition to, rather than instead of, the other statutes upon which it rests. As courts have interpreted it, the legislative intent with respect to the armed violence statute was simply to "counteract the much publicized increase in crime rate," and describe certain offenses as more serious if committed by persons who are armed.' The Illinois Supreme Court has never reached the question of whether the duplicative aspects of the statute are constitutional. The closest it came was in People v. McCollough, 1 7 where the court held that a prosecutor had the option of charging an automobile driver who ran over a pedestrian with either reckless homicide or involuntary manslaughter, the latter having the harsher penalty. It reversed the appellate court, which had found a deprivation of both due process and equal protection because of the unguided discretion to impose different charges of punishment for identical acts under identical circumstances. 173 The supreme court ignored the lower court's reliance on the Berra dissent, 7 holding that the discretion exercised was like the kind of discretion exercised every day by the prosecutor in his charging decisions.'
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Following this opinion, every Illinois appellate court considering the constitutionality of the armed violence statute relied on McCollough's discussion of reckless homicide and involuntary manslaughter to uphold it. 76 Although state courts usually follow their own supreme court, this reliance is troublesome in view of the fact that McCollough was decided 4-3, with the dissent 177 vigorously citing to Berra, and to four different state supreme court 17 People v. Hardaway, 108 Ill. App. 2d 325, 332, 247 N.E.2d 626, 630 (1969 Unfortunately this solves only one of the problems occurring when juries face multiple charges. Even if they are not allowed to compromise by convicting on only one of the two charged crimes, they still may give undue weight to the fact that there are so many charges in the first place. A jury might not realize that even though it looks as if the defendant has been involved in several possibly criminal actions, in truth he has only been involved in one.
The ideal way to test this hypothesis would be to divide defendants into two groups and compare their conviction rates. One group would consist of those charged only with the crime on which the armed violence charge is based, but who used a dangerous weapon. The other group would consist of defendants charged with both the other crime and armed violence. If the conviction rate for the latter group were higher, it would mean that the multiple counts were unduly prejudicing the defendants. Unfortunately, no such research has been done on this topic.
Other studies, comparing conviction rates for multiple charges and single charges of the same magnitude, would be nearly as useful. Surprisingly, no such study of this type has been made either.ss However, an analysis of the studies on jury behavior which do exist indicates that the multiple charges probably are given too much weight. According to Kalven and Zeisel, fully 43% of the jury cases are rated by thejudge as "close."' 89 Therefore, any untoward circumstances could tip the balance against the defendant in a large number of cases. 87-90 (1978) , for the importance of the jurors' initial decision made before any evidence is admitted.
ing him to lose a case he might otherwise have won.
At least one study strongly indicates that there is a sound basis for fearing multiple counts and confused juries. After hearing a Florida jury instruction that when the defendant pleads not guilty, the state must prove each material allegation of the information or indictment beyond a reasonable doubt, 6% of the jurors thought the state need prove only a "majority" of the charges.1 9 2
Five percent of the jurors were so confused that they thought the defendant was required to carry the burden of proving his own innocence, 3% thought the judge was to decide innocence, and 9% were simply uncertain. 93 Ifjuries became this confused over the burden of proof to prove a single charge, then filing multiple charges can only compound the confusion.
The armed violence statute can inflame the jury as well as confuse it. If the jury is presented with two charges rather than one, it may believe that more than one type of criminal conduct is involved, even though both statutes actually define the same conduct. The confusion may be great enough to cause the jury to believe that the defendant has been involved in several criminal acts, and that he therefore has a criminal character. From this, it is an easy step to assume that somebody with a criminal character has committed the act he is accused of.
This danger has been recognized in other situations. Congress prevents the prosecution from presenting evidence of the defendant's past crimes or wrongs to show that he acted in conformity with them by committing the crime charged. 98 The danger is that the past crimes will cause the jury to believe the defendant is a criminal and therefore convict him. Multiple charges based on the same conduct have a similar effect. The extra charges magnify the act out of all proportion, making the defendant look worse than he really is.
The comparison to evidence of past criminal acts is particularly apt because jury research has shown that such evidence has the very effect that legisla- Congress's fear of the use of the criminal reputation to infer guilt' 98 is justified in light of the findings of the various jury research studies. The same jury behavior almost certainly takes place when the armed violence statute is charged. Defendants charged with armed violence are at a great disadvantage because of the undue prejudice that charge will cause.
Thus the problem which was not ruled on in Batchelder becomes clear. The prosecutor's discretion to bring multiple charges or a single charge for the same act permits him to choose which defendants will get a confused and inflamed jury. Note that though the prosecutor has similar discretion to bring greater and lesser included charges, that situation is different because the two involve different conduct, and the jury knows it must choose between the two on the basis of proof adduced at trial. When, however, the multiple charges are armed violence and the offense on which it rests, the jury must take both statutes or none; variations of proof do not let it choose the statute under which to convict.
In the armed violence setting, erratic jury behavior suggests that the defendant charged under both statutes is more likely to be convicted than one charged only with the single underlying non-armed violence statute. Thus the situation provides a twist from Batchelder. There, the penalties were different, but the jury was no more likely to convict under one than under the other. Under the Illinois Armed Violence Statute, not only are the penalties more disparate than those in Batchelder,'" but also the defendant's conduct falls within the common proscription. Batchelder can be attacked on both legal and policy grounds, but it was a unanimous opinion, and therefore unlikely to be reversed. The Batchelder opinion, however, covers only one of the three separate categories in which duplicative statutes may fall. Overlapping statutes are constitutional, but an unbroken line of state cases indicates that statutes identical except for penalty are unconstitutional. The case is not as clear for optional included duplicative statutes, but the dangers of prejudice indicate that they too should not be used. Legislatures have the option to prevent all three situations by careful drafting. The inherent unfairness in treating similarly situated defendants differently outweighs the advantages in individualizing system response to defendants to such an extent that this area of prosecutorial discretion should be removed. Legislatures should draft statutes so that no two statutes (except greater and lesser included statutes) can be interpreted to prohibit the same conduct, thus taking the choice out of the prosecutor's hands.
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